"We have a large machine," Gordon once said, "and we find a great many securities have to be fed through it if we want to break even." That statement, made some twenty years earlier during the antitrust trial, applied with even more force in the 1970s when competition from commercial banks and other financial intermediaries moved into areas once considered exclusively the domain of investment houses. To hold on to its old clients and win new ones while serving them both efficiently, as well as to guard against possible steeper declines in brokerage income, the most vulnerable source of an investment firm's earnings, Kidder, Peabody strengthened its traditional services and added new ones, two of the most important being project financing and trading in options. Between 1970 and 1975 the firm's lease financings of plant and equipment totaled $502.3 million and the volume of its options transactions also grew substantially, particularly after April 1973 when the Chicago Board of Options opened for business.
Option trading-a contract to buy or sell a specified number of shares of a certain stock at a determined price within a defined period-was an old business, the instruments themselves dating back to antiquity. Options regained popularity in the early 1970s because, in the words of the Chicago Board of Options, they offered investors opportunities for a "potentially large profit from a relatively small investment with a known and predetermined risk," provided the buyer made the right decision (some preferred the word bet) on a stock's future movement and acted on it in time. Options, like other investments, also carried the risk of losses. But whether the option buyer made or lost money the brokers dealing in these instruments earned handsome commissions, sometimes as many as three or four in a single operation.
‘Options trading’ was a profitable business. Dealers in these securities, said SEC chairman Roderick M. Hills, "make more money from options than they foresee making from new stock issues." Hills was concerned the option business would siphon off seed money from new enterprises. "I'd like to get some of the horse-betting money on stocks," he said in July 1976 when he announced plans to have the SEC study the economic effects of option trading. Kidder, Peabody not only traded in options-these operations helped offset some 50 percent of the firm's decline in commission earnings-but also included the instruments in its portfolio management service. Gary L. Gastineau, the manager of Kidder, Peabody's options portfolio service, was an experienced security analyst and portfolio manager whose book The Stock Options Manual (McGraw-Hill, 1975) analyzed the various techniques for evaluating option contracts, with special reference to the computerized model he developed with Professor Albert Madansky of the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business Administration.
Investment management and advisory functions provided still other opportunities to expand Kidder, Peabody's income-producing services. Although investment management was a highly competitive business with several types of financial intermediaries seeking to serve a relatively small clientele of individuals and institutions, it allowed Kidder, Peabody to employ more fully and effectively its resources and expertise. The decision to expand this area of its operations was strengthened by the acquisition of Clark, Dodge & Co., which had a substantial and well-staffed management service. Five of its top managers joined Kidder, Peabody and together with its own advisory group provided the firm with a large experienced staff. In January, 1976, Kidder, Peabody reorganized and consolidated all its investment management and advisory services, assigning them to a new and separate subsidiary called the Webster Management Corporation. The new corporate entity, named after Edwin S. Webster, Jr., Kidder, Peabody's senior partner from 1931 until his death in November 1957, was designed to provide the benefits of outside investment research and in the words of the corporation's officers, assure its fourteen senior and five associate portfolio managers the required "autonomy and independence in decision making." At the time of its organization Webster Management took over accounts valued in excess of $460 million, some 50 percent of which belonged to individuals with the rest almost equally divided between tax exempt funds and those of corporations and other institutions.